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The present Missouri law as to sexual offenses is partly statutory,
mostly decisional, and entirely in need of revision and reform. The statutes
are scattered instead of brought together in one comprehensive, coherent,
and consistent code of conduct. Many have not been altered in any
essential detail since first enacted almost a century and a half ago.' Thus,
they reflect none of the tremendous changes that have taken place in
sexual mores, attitudes, and behavior since then. Since Missouri entered
the Union we have vastly increased our store of knowledge about sexual
conduct and methods of dealing with offenders. Sexual psychopath laws
are society's only attempt to utilize that knowledge for the purpose of
treating sex offenders, 2 and many psychiatrists and criminologists agree
that such laws have been miserable failures.
Those sex crime statutes that are obsolete and seldom used by prosecu-
tors should be scrapped. Most of them abound with archaisms, euphemisms
and emotionally charged words such as "ravish," "carnal knowledge,"
"defile," "debauch," "concubinage," and "abominable and detestable crime
against nature." Some statutes are so incomplete or uncertain as to be
subject to serious constitutional objections on void-for-vagueness grounds.
Others may be invalid insofar as they overreach any permissible legislative
mark or penalize conduct wholly incapable of equal enforcement. Although
some definiteness and limitation has been attained through judicial
construction, the law ought to be readily found in statute books; finding
it ought not require laborious sifting through mounds of moldering
buckram.
*Washington University, A.B. 1929, M.A. 1930, J.D. 1933. Circuit Judge,
St. Louis County, Missouri.
1. "The details of our current law of sexual offenses were worked out in
the late middle ages, and since shortly after this country had been settled, the
law of sexual offenses underwent virtually no further change, except as to pro-
cedural details and punishments." G. MUELLER, LEGAL REGULATIONS Or SEXUAL
CONDUar 16 (1961). The major sex offenses were punishable in ecclesiastical
courts because crime was equated with sin. Id. Many such laws became unen-
forceable for lack of popular support. They have not been changed by the
legislature in many states because
the good people . . . speaking through their legislatures, are as yet
unwilling to grant sexual liberties to their neighbors which, at least
according to Dr. Kinsey, they allow themselves.
Only an intellectually numb person can still maintain that the criminal
law, with the traditional means at its command, can enforce the sexual
standard which it endorses. It cannot, and we must face the fact.
Id. at 17.
2. See §§ 202.700-.770, RSMo 1969. See generally B. KARI'MAN, THE SEXUAL
OFFENDER AND His OFFENSES (1954); Slough & Schwinn, The Sexual Psychopath,
19 U.K.C.L. REv. 131 (1951). (371)
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But all of these deficiencies could continue to be wearily worried with
as they have been for decades. We could go on forever talking in hushed,
shocked tones about "lurking sex fiends," joking about the gay set, and
increasing the "age of consent" in the blind belief that we are propping
forbidden fruit higher away from our children. We could keep hiking
penalties higher upon the sodden supposition that longer isolation of
the few offenders who are caught, convicted, and incarcerated will either
reform them or deter others.
The fundamental inadequacy of the Missouri law of sex offenses
is the monolithic character of the major crimes of rape, sodomy, and child
molestation, all of which carry extremely severe punishment. What is
needed is a splitting of these offenses into a number of separate crimes
according to logical differentiating factors that permit appropriate grading
of the penalties. As the law now stands, it is unjust to the individual
offender, and only the legislature can remedy that injustice. Moreover,
current law fails to serve the best interests of society. There is no deterrence
and no rehabilitation. Those few who are punished are dealt with cruelly,
to the satisfaction of no one except a shrinking frenetic fringe of maniacal
moralists.
An unjust law will not be enforced. The public is loath to report,
police to arrest, prosecutors to pursue, jurors to convict, and judges to
sentence offenders. One reason is that the statutory definitions of these
crimes and their heavy punishment make no allowance for innocent intent,
consent, ages of maturity as distinguished from a single "age of consent,"
mistake as to the age of the victim, or immaturity of the accused.
Unenforceable and unenforced laws lead to disrespect for law in
general. Vicious side effects develop, including blackmail, commercialized
vice, police corruption, and brazen law violation. Uneven and discrimi-
natory enforcement follows. The sex deviate is driven underground and
into houses of male and female prostitution. The few who are caught are
branded as "rapists" or "sodomists" and sent away to prison to enjoy their
perversions with others deprived of heterosexual outlets. The many who
escape prosecution lead uneasy lives of fear, evasion, and guilt.
The Proposed Missouri Criminal Code4 offers only a partial solution,
and one within the grasp only of the legislature. 5 The larger part of
3. See § 559.260, RSMo 1969 (rape); §§ 563.230 (sodomy) & .160 (child
molestation), RSMo 1969.
4. The Proposed New Missouri Criminal Code [hereinafter referred to as
the Proposed Code] was drafted over a period of four years and completed in the
late summer of 1973 by the Committee for a Modem Criminal Code [hereinafter
referred to as the committee] whose composition and work in general and in
certain specific areas is described elsewhere in this symposium.
5. The task is "primarily and properly the job of legislators, not judges."
Rodell, Our Unlovable Sex Laws, TANs-AcToN, May 1965, at 36, 38. Missouri's
sodomy statute, amended only once since enacted in 1825, is a remarkable exam ple
of an inadequate definition by judicial decision held constitutionally certain be-
cause of what the courts have added to it over a century and a half. State v. Craw-
ford, 478 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1972).
[Vol. 38
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needed reform must come through education, acculturation of offenders,
the application of medical and social sciences to the problem, and, more
than anything else, more understanding and tolerance of all of the diverse
minorities that make up our society.
II. METHODOLOGY AND GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
Chapter 11 of the Proposed Code, entitled "Sexual Offenses," is a
part of article IV, which also includes crimes against public decency and
the family. It defines and deals with offenses involving four types of sexual
conduct: sexual intercourse (rape and related offenses); deviate sexual
intercourse (sodomy and related offenses); sexual abuse (touching for
the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire); and indecent exposure.
Other sex-related offenses are covered elsewhere in the Proposed Code un-
der more appropriate classifications of the interests sought to be protected.
For example, bigamy, incest, and endangering the welfare of a child (now
"'contributing to the delinquency of a minor") are basically offenses against
the family and are so classified in the Proposed Code.
The committee adhered as closely as it could to its avowed policy
of criminalizing only that conduct which a very substantial number of
Missourians today consider either to endanger or harm significant, legally
protected individual and social interests. In the field of sexual offenses,
as in a few other areas, special protection was extended to those incapable
of mature judgment or so incapacitated as to be incapable of making
decisions for themselves. The committee did not undertake to write a
moral code.6 It sought and found valid secular aims in support of its
6. The authors of the Model Penal Code said of their seminal efforts:
The Code does not attempt to use the power of the state to enforce
purely moral or religious standards. We deem it inappropriate for the
government to attempt to control behavior that has no substantial sig-
nificance except as to the morality of the actor. Such matters are best left
to religious, educational and other social influences. Apart from the ques-
tion of constitutionality which might be raised against legislation avowedly
commanding adherence to a particular religious or moral tenet, it must
be recognized, as a practical matter, that in a heterogeneous community
such as ours, different individuals and groups have widely divergent views
of the seriousness of various moral derelictions.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). This view-
point represents only one side of the highly controversial subject of the
proper relation of law to morals. The debate began in the 19th century with
the treatises of J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859) and STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY AND
FRATERNITY (2d ed. 1874). It was re-stimulated by the English COMMITEE ON
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PRoSrITUnON, REPORT, CMDN. 247 (1963) to which
Sir Patrick Devlin replied in his lecture on "The Enforcement of Morals" (1959),
later published in book form under that name in 1965. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCE-
MENT OF MORALS (1965). His principle opponent for a while was Professor Hart,
who took the libertarian view of Mill. H. HART, LAw, LIBERTY AND MORALITY
(1963); Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1 (1967). See also, H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968);
N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL
(1970); Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986
(1966); Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLum.
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decisions to criminalize some "crimes without victims," such as gambling,
prostitution, marijuana use, obscenity, and consensual adult sodomy, even
though religious and moral tenets were undoubtedly served coincidentally."
Like all of the Proposed Code, chapter 15 was drafted upon the basic
assumption that by identifying and defining socially intolerable conduct and
subjecting it to legally enforceable sanctions, all interests of society would
be promoted. Three questions are presented; they need not be answered
in a particular order. First, what conduct is socially intolerable in Mis-
souri today?8 Second, of such conduct, which should be criminalized rather
L. REv. 391 (1963); Junker, Criminalization and Criminogenesis, 19 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 697 (1972); Kadish, More on Overcriminalization: A Reply to Professor
Junker, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 719 (1972); Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminaliztion,
ANNALS Nov. 1967, at 15; Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE
L.J. 837 (1972); Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 1960 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 174;
Sartorius, The Enforcement of Morality, 81 YALE L.J. 891 (1972); Schwartz,
Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 669 (1963);
Skolnick, Criminalization and Criminogenesis: A Reply to Professor Junker, 19
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 715 (1972); Skolnick, Coercion to Virtue: The Enforcement of
Morals, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 588 (1968).
All arguments seem to weigh most heavily against the legal enforcement of
morality. The Mill-Hart-Packer-Skolnik-Morris forces may invoke constitutional
objections that the English Lord Devlin did not need to face. See, for example,
the analogous reasoning that might be developed from the abortion case of Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and the many decisions it cites involving privacy
and other constitutional rights.
What may not have been apparent to the Model Penal Code's reporters in
1955 is that although law was originally called upon to define and punish only
clearly anti-social and dangerous conduct, it is now required to take over many
of the social controls formerly exercised by churches, schools, families, and other
social institutions because their control has waned and become increasingly
ineffective. R. PERixNs, CRIMINAL LAw 4 (2d ed. 1969). None of these institutions
seems any longer able to affect the changing morality (or immorality) of our
times, the white-collar crimes and all of the rest, including new attitudes of
permissiveness about sexual freedom.
7. No one can win the argument when pitched on the plane of morals;
the trick is to find secular benefits that will support one side or the other. Thus,
those opposed to "crimes without victims" argue the practical problems stem-
ming from laws against gambling, drunkenness, prostitution, etc. Olivieri &
Finkelstein, Report on "Victimless Crime" in New York State, 18 N.Y.L. FORUM
77 (1972). See also note 54 and accompanying text infra, dealing with consensual
adult sodomy. The committee took the view that in a democracy the majority
has a right within constitutional limits to enact any law, whether enforceable
or not, if it does nothing more than express society's values. Some of these
matters were touched upon in a symposium on the Model Penal Code. See
Henkin, supra note 6; Schwartz, supra note 6. The committee's view that it could
propose laws defensible for secular reasons even if the community's moral or
religious beliefs happened to agree is put rather well in a limerick recited by
one of the participants in A Symposium on Morality, 34 AM. SCHOLAR 347, 360(s. 1965): [.There was] the young lady named Wilde
Who kept herself quite undefiled
Through thinking of Jesus
And social diseases
And the dangers of having a child.
8. Conduct "socially intolerable" varies from social culture to social culture,
from time to time, and from place to place; it even varies within a particular
state according to social, racial, economic, and other structures. "In many states,
[Vol. 38
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than left to nonlegal social controls?9 Third, what legal sanctions should
be imposed?1 0 Thus, to consider what appears to be the most critical
example, is consensual sodomy between adults not married to one another
socially intolerable in Missouri today? If so, should its practice be made
a crime? If so, what punishment or other methods of dealing with the
crime should be adopted where violations occur?11
all sexual behavior (including fornication and in some places solitary masturba-
tion by an adult) is illegal except for face-to-face intercourse with one's spouse."
Slovenko & Phillips, Psychosexuality and the Criminal Law, 15 VAND. L. REV.
797, 799 (1962). But neither our criminal laws nor our publicly-voiced moral
codes as to impermissible conduct are obeyed by a substantial segment of society.
Kinsey reported in 1948 as to males and in 1953 as to females that about one-half
of all married males and about one-quarter of all married females commit at
least one adulterous act, and one out of every six females who did not do so at
least wanted to or considered it. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 585 (1948) [hereinafter cited as KINSEY, HUMAN
MALE]; A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN & P. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN
THE HUMAN FEMALE 416, 419-20 (1953) [hereinafter cited as KINSEY, HUMAN Fx-
MALE]. There is a high incidence of premarital sex (fornication) in the United
States, even though it is prohibited, at least when indulged in "openly and
notoriously," in all but about 10 states including Missouri. Id. at 801. "The
president of a mid-western university recently remarked that three things are
essential for a happy and alert university: parking for the faculty, athletics for
the alumni, and, most important, sex for the students." Id. at 799 n.6. It is
estimated that there are about 2,600,000 men and 1,400,000 women who are
exclusively homosexual in the United States. NATIONAL INsTITUTE OF MENTAL
HEALTH, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY 4 (1969); TIME,
Oct. 31, 1969, at 56. Some 56 percent of all males have had some homosexual con-
tact by age 55. KINSEY, HUMAN MALE 650-51. This means that almost everyone in
the United States could at one time or another during his life have been convicted
of a felony for a sexual offense or, at least, that everyone has violated his avowed
moral code. "Not one in a million such episodes is likely to be discovered, none
in a hundred million prosecuted." Rodell, Our Unlovable Sex Laws, TRANs-AcTION,
May 1965, at 36.
9. There are many reasons why some "socially intolerable conduct" should
not be criminalized, and, surprising enough, one is criminogenesis. Rose, Law
and the Causation of Social Problems, 16 Soc. PROB. 33 (1968). Labeling a person
as a "homo" or criminal sodomist will not only affect his future conduct and
condition in life but will open up other disturbing public problems of black-
mail, police corruption, and efficiency in criminal law enforcement and process-
ing. Smith & Pollack, Less, Not More: Police, Courts, Prisons, FED. PROB., Sept.
1972, at 12; see note 6 supra and authorities therein cited.
10. This is the most important question of all: what to do with the offenders.
There are some who doubt the efficacy of placing a habitual sexual pervert in
prison in the company of others of the same sex who are similarly inclined and
have no other sexual outlet except masturbation. Fisher, The Sex Offender Pro-
visions of the Proposed New Maryland Criminal Code, 30 MD. L. REv. 91, 93
(1970).
11. One is reminded of the multiple considerations affecting the decision
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) involving abortion statutes. Much of any
code of sexual offenses is an "inevitable fusion of secular law and religious
belief." P. GEBHARD, J. GAGNON, W. POMEROY & C. CmUSTENSON, SEX OFFENDERS 3
(1965) [hereinafter cited as GEBHARD]. Moreover, "sexual morals are so intimate
a part of religious belief that a flagrant breach of them is often felt to be an
assault on religion itself." M. GurrMACHER, SEX OFFENSES 15 (1951). But a
criminal code ought to be more than a mere declaration of righteous principles.
It must be practical and take into account the operation of the entire criminal
justice system, including the public's disposition, or lack thereof, to make corn-
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The committee was well aware of the impermanence of any set of
laws. It was not writing an eternal code of conduct, and certainly not one
dealing with sexual offenses.1 2 On the other hand, it knew that laws once
enacted tend to become entrenched for many reasons, including the vigor
of militant reformists.13 Hence, the committee considered itself compelled
to offer laws that might persist for a considerable time as a positive code
of conduct even though unleavened by judidal construction or legislative
amendment.
The committee did not intend to ease the hand of the law in dealing
with crimes that must be punished. On the contrary, the Proposed Code pro-
poses to strengthen those statutes dealing with the serious crimes involving
force, threats, the abuse or corruption of children, offensive sexual behavior
in public, and all forms of commercial obscenity and prostitution. It would
also bring some order to the "vast and varied jungle of sex legislation,"
cut away underbrush found to be "anachronistic asininity," close the gaps
between our laws and our sex attitudes and behavior, grade crimes to give
more flexibility to prosecutors, juries, and judges in prosecuting and
punishing crime, and scale penalties in a more rational way compatible
with modern notions.1 4
plaints and cooperate with law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges.
It must make allowance and provision for discretionary screening out of cases
at any point in the criminal process. According to the National Opinion Research
Center, which did certain statistical studies for the President's Crime Commis-
sion in the middle 1960's, half of all crimes are not reported to the police. There
are four times as many forcible rape cases as are recorded in the Uniform Crime
Reports. The police did not even respond in 23 percent of the cases reported
to them. Where they did respond, they did not call the incident a crime 25 per-
cent of the time. Arrests were made in only 20 percent of those cases. Only 42
percent of these were brought to trial, and 52 percent of them were convicted.
Attrition in the legal process means that a conviction is obtained in only 1 out
of every 40 incidents the people consider criminal. Ennis, Crime, Victims and
the Police, TRANs-AcriON, June 1967, at 36.
12. "Sexual freedom, on a private and mutually consenting level, has steadily
increased throughout this century." Reiss, How and Why America's Sex Standards
are Changing, TRANs-AcnoN, Mar. 1968, at 26. Others have predicted that the
old standards of sexual immorality are disappearing, but add the hopeful note
that "new standards, even if personally unwelcome, probably will work out to
the satisfaction of everyone." Prof. George Murdock, Professor of Anthropology
at Yale University, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1949, at 28, col. 6. Reiss contends that
the notions that a sex revolution is taking place and that a more permissive
sexual code is a sign of breakdown in morality are only myths based upon lack
of reliable information concerning American sexual behavior. We are in a period
of evolution, not revolution, a period of normalcy, not anomie.
13. Speaking to the need of decriminalizing much conduct, including un-
orthodox set practices of consenting adults, which diverts police, congests courts,
and overpopulates jails, the Smith and Pollack article states:
On a practical level, we must hope that the alliance that preserved
prohibition, the tacit partnership between moralists and gangsters, be-
tween the Women's Christian Temperance Union and the bootleggers,
will not re-form to thwart the most feasible plan for alleviating the
present crisis.
Smith & Pollack, Less, Not More: Police, Courts, Prisons, FED. PROB., Sept. 1972,
at 18.
14. Rodell, supra note 5 at 38.
[V/ol. 38
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The first two sections of chapter 15 of the Proposed Code deal with
chapter definitions and matters of general applicability, such as consent,
mistake as to capacity to consent, and mistake as to age. The balance of
the chapter defines, classifies, and grades eleven separate sexual offenses.
This was accomplished by first selecting four types of sexual acts (as
distinguished from "misconduct") susceptible of and needing regulation 15
and then defining the eleven separate crimes as instances in which one
of the four sexual acts should be proscribed. The factors that determine
whether a particular situation amounts to one of these instances include
the use of force, the lack of consent, the age of the victim, the age of
the actor, and the physical or mental capacity of the victim to give or
refuse consent. Provisions for appropriate penalties were added; the full
range of felonies from class A through class D and two of the three classes
of misdemeanors, A and B, were employed.16 Nine of the eleven crimes
were escalated one grade if serious bodily injury was inflicted or if a deadly
weapon was displayed in a threatening manner.
Every move that the committee made in constructing chapter 15 in-
volved a number of critical decisions based upon multiple considerations
derived from the wealth of background material supplied by the reporters,
which was supplemented by reading, study, and extended discussion by
members of the comipittee. The committee did not hesitate to depart
from the formulations of the Model Penal Code, recent legislation in
other states, or the existing law of Missouri where that action seemed
wise. The balance of this article will be devoted to pointing out most
of the decisions made by the committee and at least sketching a few of
the reasons therefor.
III. THE PROSCRIBED SEXUAL ACrs
Chapter 11 deals with two broad forms of sexual conduct: first, sexual
intercourse, both vaginal (such as rape) and deViate (such as sodomy),
and second, other sex-oriented acts not involving sexual intercourse, such
as indecent exposure and the touching of certain intimate parts of the
person, either directly or through clothing, for purposes of sexual arousal
or gratification.
Section 11.010 defines some of the terms or acts referred to. "Sexual
intercourse" carries its traditional meaning of "penetration, however slight,
of the female sex organ by the male sex organ, whether or not an emission
results." "Deviate sexual intercourse" is defined as "any sexual act involv-
ing the genitals of one person and the mouth, tongue or anus of another
person." The Proposed Code defines "sexual contact" as meaning "any
touching of the genitals or anus of any person, or the breast of any female
person, or any such touching through the clothing, for the purpose of arous-
ing or gratifying sexual desire of any person." The phrase "indecent ex-
15. See pt. III of this article.
16. PROP. NEw Mo. Calm. CODE §§ 11.030-.130 (1973).
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posure" is not separately defined. The Proposed Code crime is the knowing
exposure of genitals under circumstances known to be likely to cause
affront or alarm.
It is neither desirable nor necessary to include as "sexual offenses"
a number of other forms of sexual gratification or arousal, such as sexual
acts with animals' 7 or corpses, adultery or fornication,18 peeping, and
certain minor forms of possible annoyance, such as the touching of bodily
zones not highly intimate or erogenous. Nor should mere solicitation to
participate in a sexual act for purposes other than prostitution be criminal.
Prosecutions for any such conduct have been virtually nonexistent in this
state and there is no discernible demand for laws making such conduct
a crime. Most of these forms of conduct have no "victim." They are pri-
marily offenses against morals, and more amenable to psychiatric care than
rehabilitation through the criminal justice system. Finally, most such
conduct is probably punishable, where that is desired, as some other kind
of offense under other sections of the penal code.
Seduction should not be treated as a sexual offense.19 In classical
seduction the victim consents to sexual intercourse under promise of mar-
riage. Whether it should even create a civil cause of action is a matter
of considerable controversy. A legitimate question may arise whether the
woman yielded her favors in exchange for an exacted promise of mar-
riage, in which case it is difficult to identify which one was the seducer
and which the victim. If the principal damage or harm is to the reputa-
tion of the female, as would seem to be the theory, then a public prosecu-
tion or imprisonment of the man can only aggravate the victim's injury,
17. The present Missouri sodomy statute prohibits bestiality. See § 563.230,
RSMo 1969. In the last 140 years one conviction reached the appellate courts.
State v. Wilson, 361 Mo. 78, 300 S.W. 710 (1927) (sexual intercourse with a mare),
The use in privacy of animals for sexual release, a common practice, perhaps, in
rural areas, "differs little in essence from solitary masturbation." Time is not
yet appropriate to criminalize the latter. Rodell, supra note 5 at 88.
18. Under the Missouri Digest topic of "Fornication" only two cases are
cited. The act never rose to the dignity of a common law crime, and according
to Blackstone, it and adultery were "left to the feeble coercion of the spiritual
court according to the rules of the canon law". 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*65. The early English canon law seems to have been concerned with illicit
intercourse only if it might adulterate the blood. Hence, the sin of fornication
could be committed only if the female was unmarried, adultery only if she was
married. R. PERurNs, CRIMINAL LAW 329 (2d ed. 1969). When Missouri adopted
its first incest statute in 1835, it condemned the conduct by those related persons
who committed "adultery or fornication with each other" or "who shall lewdly
and lasciviously cohabit with each other." § 6, RSMo 1835 [now § 563.220,
RSMo 1969]. Prior to that, a statute made it criminal for persons to live in "a
state of open and notorious adultery," and for "every man and woman, one or
both of whom are married, and not to each other, who shall lewdly and las.
civiously abide and cohabit with each other." § 77, RSMo 1825 [now § 563.150,
RSMo 1969]. Thus, some threads of the canon law were woven into Missouri law
where they remain today, although prosecutions under the statute are extremely
rare.
19. But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (1962).
The current Missouri statute is § 559.310, RSMo 1969. The last prosecution there-
under was in 1935.
[Vol. 38
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/3
SYMPOSIUM-PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE
Where a pregnancy results the woman has much to gain by access to a
criminal liability charge since she has a strong lever to force marriage.
Consequently many criminal seduction statutes allow the villain to purge
himself, so to speak, by marrying the woman.2 0 On the other hand, she
has at least two better means of redress: a civil action for damages based
upon the seduction and civil and criminal action based upon nonsupport
of the child.
IV. DIFFERENI ATING FAGroRs
A. Sex
In its chapter on sexual offenses, the Proposed Code makes no dis-
tinctions based upon the sex of the actor or the victim. Women are given
equal protection of the laws, but they are held equally responsible. The
criminal law should not be based upon "the premise that women are
weak-willed, naive, and easily preyed upon by men who are more clever
and always stronger."21 Such a policy would not preclude legislation taking
into account physical characteristics unique to one sex.22 Nor is it nullified
by the fact that men are more likely to commit certain crimes than women,
or vice versa.2 3 The plain fact is that in this modem day the male victim
of a sex crime is entitled to the same protection as a woman, and the
female offender should be subject to the same punishment as a man.2 4
20. § 559.310, RSMo 1969, provides in part:
[IJf, before the jury is sworn to try the defendant upon an indictment
or information, he shall marry the woman thus seduced, it shall be a
bar to any further prosecution of the offense....
21. Note, Sex Discrimination in the Criminal Law: The Effect of the Equal
Rights Amendment, 11 AM. CRIm. L. REv. 469, 473 (1973). For an excellent
symposium on the subject, see Women and the Criminal Law, 11 AM. Caum. L.
Rxv. 291 (1973).
22. See Note, supra note 21, at 470. The Proposed Code defines "sexual
contact" as including the touching of the breast of a female.
23. Id. at 471 n.10. The author cites statistics as to murder and robbery,
but omits prostitution. It is true, however, that males far outnumber females
in the commission of crime. Sexual offenses committed by females are so rare
that the studies of the Kinsey Institute excluded them. See GEBHARD, supra note
11, at 9. Some of the reasons given were society's tolerance or tendency to ignore
female sex offenses other than prostitution, hesitance to make complaints against
females, reluctance of juries to convict, the discreetness observed by lesbians,
the average female's "much weaker 'sex drive' than the average male," rare resort
to violence by the female, scarcity of female peepers and exhibitionists, and,
of course, the bald fact that females do indeed commit fewer illegal sexual acts
than males.
24. A dassic example of sex discrimination under the present law is the
observation that a man caught watching through a window while a woman
undresses may be arrested as a voyeur, whereas if the sexes are reversed the
undressing man may be held as an exhibitionist. The present Missouri sex crime
laws are highly discriminatory against males. Sex differences between male and
female have a great deal to do with the active role of males and the passive role
of females in normal sexual conduct as well as criminal sexual activities. Simon
&c Gagnon, Psychosexual Development, TRANs-AGrION, Mar. 1969, at 9. Today,
parity is being approached. Reiss, How and Why America's Sex Standards are
Changing, TANs-AcrION, Mar. 1968, at 26. Seduction, for example, is fading both
as a crime and cause for civil action.
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B. Status
The prohibitions of chapter 11 do not apply to a man and woman
living together as man and wife, regardless of the legal status of their
relationship, and "[s]pouses living apart pursuant to a judgment of nullity
or legal separation are not married to each other for purposes of this
Chapter."25
At common law a man could not rape his wife because the sexual
intercourse was not "unlawful," but either party might be guilty of
sodomy.26 Although wife-beating is a punishable battery, a forcible sexual
assault is probably not a crime under the present law unless it is deviate,
i.e., sodomistic. The difficult problems of proof and enforcement and the
desirability of not attempting to interfere with otherwise aggressive or
offensive advances of one spouse upon another lead to the conclusion
that the law, not the spouse, should adopt a "hands off" policy.
Although the Code would prohibit consensual deviate sexual inter-
course between unmarried adults for reasons discussed later, it does not
attempt to criminalize such conduct of married people. Some of it is
advised or encouraged by marriage manuals and counselors, medical and
otherwise.2 7 If there is any "crime" it is a moral one without a "victim."
C. Age
One of the objections most often voiced to existing sex crime legisla-
tion is that it establishes a high "age of consent" with the same severe
penalties attached to "statutory" as to forcible rape.28 Historically, the
"age of consent" in Missouri and elsewhere has ascended, and the punish-
ment has become increasingly severe. 20 The "age of consent" for rape
began in Missouri in 1825 at 10 years; advanced to 12 years in 1879, to
25. PROP. NEw Mo. Ctnm. CODE § 11.010 (4) (1973).
26. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 156 (2d ed. 1969). Of course, a man may be
guilty of rape of his wife if he is an accessory. State v. Drope, 462 S.W.2d 677
(Mo. 1971).
27. Ploscowe, Sex Offenses in the New Penal Law, 32 BROOKLYN L. REV. 274,
275-76 (1966). Ploscowe, a former judge in New York and considered an authority
on sex crimes, thought that New York's new penal code (1965) was "stupid" in
prohibiting adult consensual homosexuality. With respect to New York's relaxa-
tion of that rule in the case of man and wife living together, he wickedly observed
that "if a man or woman want sex legitimately through deviate means, he or
she must marry some one with similar tastes". Ploscowe, supra at 276. But how
can a holy sacrament convert sybaritic sin into mere domestic dalliance?
28. At common law the age of consent was 10 years. 4 W. BLACKSTONE.,
COMMENTARms 210, 212. "Age of consent" usually refers to the rape statutes under
which lack of consent is not an essential element of the crime where a child
below a certain age is "carnally known." Because mistake as to age is no defense
at common law and intent to rape is an automatic ingredient, the offense becomes
one of "strict liability." The only issue of fact is penetration. State v. Coffman,
360 Mo. 782, 230 S.W.2d 761 (1950). Emission is not required. State v. Cobb,
359 Mo. 373, 221 S.W.2d 745 (1949).
29. It has been suggested that the age of majority was not based on sexual
maturity or judgment, but rather rose from 14 to 21 as the weight of arms borne
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14 years in 1889, and to 15 years in 1913; and came to rest at 16 years in
1921.
Although the adoption of an "age of consent" or the use of age differ-
ences in grading sex crimes has been criticized,30 it seems an unavoidable
result of attempting to enact special laws designed (1) to protect those
deemed inexperienced and immature in judgment, and (2) to deny them
a taste of that forbidden fruit that would give them the experience they
lack. Establishing an age of consent and then grading various offenses
according to the age of the victim or the age of the actor or both involve
crucial and difficult differentiations. The higher the age of consent, the
greater the number of crimes created. An arbitrary age does, indeed, ignore
individual differences.
One solution would be to create overlapping offenses, and thus permit
prosecutor and, perhaps, jury discretion. However, our experience with
the Habitual Criminal Law alone, where the jury could and did completely
ignore undisputed facts, was a dismal one. Therefore, the committee
decided upon a straightforward approach.
The Proposed Code treats victims under 16 years of age as incapable
of consenting to any of the prohibited sexual conduct except sexual contact
(touching other than by intercourse) of a person 14 or 15 years of age
by another person less than 17 years of age. However, various offenses
are graded according to the age of the victim with appropriate adjust-
ments of the penalties. Sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse
between persons not married to each other is sexual assault in the first
degree where the child is 12 or 13 years of age, and sexual assault in the
second degree where the child is 14 or 15 and the actor is over 17 years
old. These crimes carry lesser penalties under the Proposed Code than
does rape.
Under the Proposed Code "rape" is sexual intercourse between persons
not married to each other either (1) by forcible compulsion, or (2) with
a child under 12 years of age. Deviate sexual intercourse under the same
circumstances is sodomy, which is punished as severely as rape. Sexual
abuse under the same circumstances is a felony. Indecent exposure is a
crime no matter what the age of the victim. In the first three crimes the
word "or" should not be overlooked. No matter what the age of the victim
may be, if forcible compulsion is used the crime is rape, sodomy, or sexual
abuse in the first degree.
The committee selected the age of 12 as the critical age for the
30. With respect to age gradations in the newly enacted Oregon Penal Code,
one writer said:
The conclusion seems inescapable that the Commission viewed greater
sexual freedom as potentially fulfilling to adults but usually corrupting
to the young. . . The use of an arbitrary chronological age as an
absolute criterion for sexual maturity or adulthood denies the reality of
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heaviest penalties for rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse in the first degree
for a number of reasons. The age of 12 is the commonest one for the
outset of puberty; indeed "it is known that significant numbers of girls
enter the period of sexual awakening as early as the tenth year." 81 Society
strongly condemns intercourse with a prepubescent child, whether force
is used or not. Children who have entered puberty generally are subjected
to sex offenses different from those that the below-12 children suffer.82
Usually, the child who has reached puberty is more sexually and emo-
tionally mature, more wise in the ways of the world, and more physically
capable of resisting sexual advances. The chances of persisting psychological
or physical harm from the assault are considerably reduced. A substantial
number of these young people have had sexual experience of one kind
or another.38 The female dresses and acts older than her years in many
cases, and may in various ways lead the male into a situation where he
lacks the moral and social stamina to refrain from sexual acts.84 Where
31. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, Comment at 252 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
Puberty in the female is that age at which she is capable of bearing children.
The majority of children under 12 are prepubescent; they have "not developed
pubic hair, breast enlargement and other adult sexual characteristics that are
sexually attractive to ordinary men." GEBHARD, supra note 11, at 54. The average
age of the onset of puberty in 5,000 girls in Boston and St. Louis around the
turn of the century was between 13% and 14V2 years. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4,
Comment at 252 n.134 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The age of the onset of
menstruation has declined by three years in the last century, thus accelerating
or lowering the age of physical maturity, which is at least one of the indications
of maturing judgment about sexual matters. J. TANNER, GROWTH AT ADOLESCENCE
152 (1962); Eisenberg, Student Unrest; Sources and Consequences, 167 ScIENcE
1689 (1970).
32. See GEBHARD, supra note 11. at 54-55, 83-85, 106, 133-34, 155-56,
177-79, 272-73, 298-99, 324-26. For example, few adult male homosexuals seem
particularly interested in boys under 12; rather, they seek only adolescent or young
adult males. Id. at 272.
33. Many studies have been made on the increasing numbers of teenagers
who have had consenual heterosexual or homosexual experiences. See A. KINSEY,
HumAN MALE, supra note 8; A. KINsEY, HumAN FEMALE, supra note 8; R. SOREN-
SEN, ADOLESCENT SEXuA.rrY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1973). Sorensen found
that by age 16 about 37 percent of all children had had sexual intercourse one
or more times. Of the remaining 63 percent, about 17 percent were "sexual be-
ginners," i.e., virgins who had actively or passively experienced sexual petting.
Kinsey's ear~ier studies may now be outdated. Even then he found that of girls
born in the 1920's, 30 percent had petted to orgasm in their teens. KINSEY,
HUMAN FEALE, supra at 244. The most telling of Sorensen's statistics are those
that indicate that there is a tremendous expansion in sexual experience between
the ages of 16 and 19. By age 20, 64 percent of all teenagers had had sexual inter-
course one or more times; 21 percent were "sexual beginners." The boys who
had had sexual intercourse outnumbered the girls by a few percentage points,
but girls outnumbered boys among "sexual beginners." Other studies, including
those of Kinsey, indicate that many young people have one or more homosexual
experiences in their teens; those experiences are generally purely experimental and
do not persist in adulthood.
34. The story is told of a man who met a good-looking girl given to heavy
cosmetics, high heels, tight dresses, provocative mannerisms, and a propensity for
drink and sexual banter. The anticipated sequence of events occurred. When
he next saw her on the witness stand in court, "they had braided her hair in
pigtails and given her a rag doll to hold." GEBHARD, supra note 11, at 84.
[Vol. 38
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no forcible compulsion is used35 the actor does not deserve the punishment
or label of "rapist" or "sodomist" when the object of his advances is over
12 years old.36
The age of 12 was selected by the Kinsey Institute for its study by
classes of various types of sex offenders as a significant age differentiating
offenders against "children" (defined as those under 12) from offenders
against "minors" (those 12 or older but less than 16 years of age). The
35. The importance of determining whether "forcible compulsion" was used
cannot be overemphasized. Resort to force or threats draws the heaviest penalties
under the present law and under the Code. It renders the age of the victim
irrelevant, just as it is irrelevant in statutory rape. Whether "forcible compul-
sion" was used in any particular case necessarily depends upon all of the circum-
stances. This is especially important where children are the victims, because
many children between the ages of 6 and 16 have been taught to refrain from
most sexual acts permitted adults. In many cases they do withhold consent and
resist sexual advances. However, their capabilities are usually limited, so that
what may not be "forcible compulsion" against an adult may well qualify where
a child is involved. The Kinsey Institute found it necessary and appropriate to
classify sex offenders by types. One of the variables was the age of the victim.
Another was whether force had been used. Obviously, the younger the child the
more difficult it is to say whether force was used.
Force ranges from unmitigated violence to, let us say, holding a child
by the wrist; threat runs the gamut from specific verbal threat or bran-
dishing a weapon to a subtle implication. In any relationship between a
child and an adult there is always in the background an element of
duress; the inevitable disparity in strength and social status is an omni-
present factor. A man, even though a stranger, is in an authoritarian,
superior position.
GEHARm, supra note 11, at 54.
There are a substantial number of heterosexual aggressors who do use force
against children from 6 to 16 years of age. The grading of sex offenses by age
is intended, therefore, only to punish in a more just fashion the consent cases,
which remain after all of the forcible compulsion cases are eliminated.
36. In the last 15 to 20 years, a vast amount of literature has developed
concerning the processes by which society labels conduct as deviate and the
consequences thereof for the individual and society. One psychiatrist suggests
dropping entirely the category of "sexual offenses" because it blocks effective
handling and treatment of individuals. Sadoff, Sexually Deviated Offenders, 40
TEMPLE L.Q. 305 (1967). The labelling theory hypothesizes that "social groups
create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and
by applying those rules to particular people and labelling them as outsiders."
H. BECKER, OUTSIDERS 8-9 (1963). A deviant label generates special and consequen-
tial difficulties for the person. A spoiled public identity in many cases reinforces
deviance rather than inhibits it, because it negatively affects the deviant's inter-
personal relationships. In a "milieu of suspicion and social disapprobation" he
finds it difficult to resume or continue conventional roles. Thus, individuals
tend to become fixed in deviance once labelled. Yet, labelling is often followed
by "deviance disavowal," such as blaming alcohol or engaging in other rationaliza-
tion in the struggle to maintain a self-image of normalcy. This is particularly
true of sex offenders, because alcohol sometimes increases the tendency to commit
sex crimes. All of this tends to hinder psychotherapy.
General discussion and bibliographies may be found in Chiricos, Inequality
in the Imposition of a Criminal Label, 19 SoC. PROB. 558 (1972); McCaghy,
Drinking and Deviance Disavowal: The Case of the Child Molesters, 16 Soc.
PaoB. 43 (1968); Rooney, Reactions to "Crimes Without Victims", 13 Soc. PROB.
400 (1966). See also Liazos, The Poverty of the Sociology of Deviance: Nuts,
Sluts, and Perverts, 20 Soc. PROB. 1031 (1972).
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committee made this same important age classification. The Model Penal
Code and the Proposed New Federal Criminal Code denominate as "rape"
sexual intercourse by force, threats and other means, including such
conduct with a female less than 10 years old. The same age marks off
"sodomy" as a crime under those proposals. Delaware adopted the age
of 12; the Proposed New Jersey Code recommends the same age. In 1955
eleven states fixed the age of consent for sexual intercourse at 12 and in
several jurisdictions the age was lower.37
Just as there are logical reasons for making distinctions based upon
the age of the victim, there are equally good reasons for penalizing actors
17 years of age or older more severely than those less than 17 years old.88
The latter are processed as juveniles unless certified for trial in the circuit
court. At 17 the average juvenile-certainly the male of the species-is
sexually mature and experienced and probably physically superior to the
average female of 14 or 15.39 Below the age of 17 the average male has
less judgment, socialization, and self-restraint than the average person in
the large class above 17 years of age. For these reasons and others sexual
assault, deviate sexual assault, and sexual abuse are given a higher offense
grading when committed by actors 17 years of age or older on 14- or 15-
year-old victims than when committed by persons under 17 years of age.
D. Chastity, Promiscuity, Character, and Reputation
Chastity and "good repute" are mentioned in only two Missouri sex
offense statutes. 40 However, evidence of chastity or lack of it and good
character or reputation or lack of them may creep into any sexual offense
37. MoDEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, Comment at 251n.126 (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955).
38. Some criminal code revision proposals predicate liability upon the age
differential between actor and "victim," rather than fixing a specific age below
which those actors not using forcible compulsion will not incur maximum liability.
See generally Comment, Sex Offenses and Penal Code Revision in Michigan, 14
WAYNE L. REv. 934, 945 (1968).
39. The KUnsey Institute did not attempt to study sex offenders under 16
years of age. First, younger persons are "swallowed up and concealed by the
secret and anonymous workings of the juvenile court system." Second,
The male in the last half of his teens is ordinarily a physical adult
or essentially so . ... We cannot rule him out of adulthood on the
basis of poor judgment or impulsiveness, for he has no monopoly on
these attributes .... At any rate, by age 16 the average male meets at
least the minimal requirements for adult life; he can function in society
as an adult if permitted to do so, and he knows what society expects of
him.
G3Fx ,RD, supra note 11, at 11. But the human female is equally ready for adult-
hood at age 16. Id. at 106. Feminists would agree and denounce any overt dis-
crimination between the sexes, such as a two-year "lead time" implicit in the
Committee's proposals. Note, Sex Discrimination in the Criminal Law, 11 Catm.
L. REv. 469 (1973). We say "implicit" because the term "actors" is neutral so
far as the Proposed Code is concerned.
40. See § 559.300, RSMo 1969 (carnal knowledge by a person over 17 of
any unmarried female between the ages of 16 and 18 of previously chaste
character) and § 559.310, RSMo 1969 (seduction of any unmarried female of good
repute under age 18).
[Vol. 38
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trial in several ways. As a result, a considerable amount of decisional law
on the subject has encrusted the law of sex crimes in Missouri.41 That
law of evidence would undoubtedly be applicable to the trial of cases
under a new penal code unless new statutes attempted to inject new
concepts into the substantive or procedural law or-perish the thought-
attempted to codify the existing decisional law on the admissibility of
evidence of chastity and character or reputation in sex offense cases.
At common law prior unchastity of the female was not a defense to
either forceful or "statutory" rape,42 and that is the law in Missouri today.
Since the Proposed Code proceeds on the hypothesis that persons under
16 lack capacity for judgment as to whether to refrain from sexual inter-
course, "it is something of a farce to inquire into their virtue." "Previous
sexual experience in this situation might well betoken previous victimiza-
tion, which should not be a defense to a subsequent victimizer." 43
On balance, therefore, the committee concluded that a rule essentially
involving credibility should not be reduced to a fixed rule.44 The present
decisional law is preferable, particularly in light of the partial allowance
of mistake as to age as an affirmative defense in section 11.015 (3) of the
Code,45 and "the unwarranted slanders on the complainant's sexual life
that the defendant's 'oath-helpers' are likely to perpetrate. ... -46
E. Consent
Some of the sexual offenses in the Proposed Code require proof of
lack of consent by the victim; others do not.47 The policy decisions of
the committee were based in part upon the following.
1. Lack of Consent in General
One convenient classification of sexual offenses is based upon the
presence or absence of forcible compulsion. The force-or-threat cases need
no discussion, because lack of consent can be implied from the use of
threats or force overcoming reasonable resistance. The cases not involving
41. The Missouri cases touching on this subject generally involve rape.
It would serve no useful purpose here to trace the winding path of the law.
Missouri probably follows majority rules. See generally Hibey, The Trial of a
Rape Case, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 309, 325 (1973); Note, The Victim in a Forcible
Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 Am. Cam. L. REv. 335, 343 (1973).
42. 4 W. BLACSTONE, COMMENTARIn *213.
43. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, Comment at 254 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
44. PROP. NEw FE . CRIm. CODE § 1648, Comment at 193 (1971).
45. PROP. Nxw Mo. Cium. CODE § 11.020(2) (1973) provides:
Mistake as to age. (a) Whenever in this Chapter the criminality of
conduct depends upon a child's being under the age of 14, it is no defense
that the defendant believed the child to be 14 years old or older. (b)
Whenever in this Chapter the criminality of conduct depends upon a
child's being 14 or 15 years of age, it is a defense that the defendant
reasonably believed that the child was 16 years old or older. (c) Reason-
able belief that the child was 16 years old or older under Subsection
(2) (b) is an affirmative defense.
46. MIcH. REv. CRim. CODE § 2331, Comment at 193 (1967).
47. Lack of consent is not an essential element of any offense defined
in chapter 11 unless specifically set out in the definition.
1973]
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force may then be divided into two subclasses: (a) those involving in-
capacitated victims, and (b) those involving others. The cases involving
incapacitated victims require no explanation; those victims are incapable
of consent, so that no showing of lack of consent need be made. The
mistaken consent cases will be discussed infra.48 That leaves a class of
victims not incapacitated physically or mentally, a class that may be sub-
divided into those under 16 and those 16 years of age and older.
Those under 16 years of age are capable, under the Proposed Code,
of consenting to only one act (sexual contact).49 This exception is a recogni-
tion of the facts of life. Many children 14 or 15 years of age and some
much younger indulge in "heavy petting." This conduct is not only com-
mon but probably normal in the psychosexual development of children
in these age groups who are not inhibited by other influences. It may
involve the touching of the female breast or touching of the sexual organs
of either or both parties. If consented to it should not be criminalized.60
2. Consensual Deviate Sexual Intercourse Between Competent Adults
Not Married to One Another
The Proposed Code makes it a crime for any person less than 17 years
old to engage in deviate sexual intercourse with any other person of any age
to whom he is not married. 51 Consent is no defense, and whether the act
took place in private or in public is irrelevant. Thus, Missouri's existing
policy criminalizing such conduct would be adhered to with only two
exceptions: (1) persons married to one another would not be punishable,
and (2) four classes of the crime would be created with differing penalties.
Bearing in mind the first underlying exception (persons married to each
other), the four classes would be differentiated according to age, capacity
to consent, and the use of forcible compulsion. It would be sexual mis-
conduct where both parties were over 17 years of age,52 deviate sexual
assault in the second degree where one party was 17 or older and the
other party was 14 or 15 years of age,58 deviate sexual assault in the first
degree where the actor was 17 or older and the other party 12 or 13 years
of age or incapacitated, 54 and sodomy if forcible compulsion was used
or if the victim was under 12 years of age.55
The committee's decision to continue to make it a crime for com-
petent, consenting adults not married to one another to engage in deviate
sexual intercourse in private may provoke more controversy than any
48. See pt. IV, § 3 (b) of this article.
49. PROP. NEw Mo. Caum. Code § 11.120 (1978).
50. The rationale is that as to "heavy petting" between contemporaries
"[p]rivate morals must be relied upon to regulate personal behavior, and criminal
sanctions are inappropriate to punish a breach of the moral law." PROP. Ky. CIuM.
CODE § 1127, Comment at 188 (1971).
51. PRop. NEw Mo. CUIM. CODE § 11.090 (1) (b) (1978).
52. Id.
58. Id. § 11.080 (1).
54. id. § 11.070 (1).
55. Id. § 11.060 (1).
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other part of the committee's work.58 A vociferous, militant, well-organized
minority with an increasing number of adherents and encouragement from
many places may vigorously challenge this provision of the Proposed Code.
57
They will be met by powerful opposition, equally vociferous, militant, and
well-organized. Religion, morals, the medical and social sciences, politics,
legal administration, and constitutional law will be drawn into the battle
and called upon by both sides for support.
The arguments pro and con have been marshalled so well by others
that it seems unnecessary to pitch them against one another here. More-
over, it would be impossible to state authoritatively which arguments the
majority of the committee considered valid. The committee was at least
consistent, because it also decided to criminalize other "crimes without
victims," such as certain aspects of gambling, abortion, prostitution, mari-
juana use, and obscenity.
Three major lines of reasoning may be urged in support of the com-
mittee's position. The first is derived from Lord Devlin: A common
morality is a necessary bond holding society together, and "mankind,
which needs society, must pay the price" by sacrificing some of its right
to otherwise unlimited freedom. The whole deadweight of sin cannot be
put upon either the criminal law, which deals with minimum standards
of conduct and punishment, or the moral law, which establishes maximum
standards and relies upon teaching, training, and exhortation. Rightly
or wrongly, most Missourians today regard homosexuality as immoral;
if the law fails to support that notion, disrespect for law and a general
loosening of the bonds of society must follow.
56. "The proposed change [decriminalizing consensual adult sodomy under
the Proposed Maryland Criminal Code] presents an issue of legislative policy
which may well rival capital punishment and abortion in its potential for arousing
public controversy." Fisher, The Sex Offender Provisions of the Proposed New
Maryland Criminal Code: Should Private Consenting Adult Homosexual Be-
havior Be Excluded?, 30 MD. L. REv. 91 (1970).
The topic has provoked a great deal of law review commentary. See, e.g.,
Cantor, Deviation and the Criminal Law, 55 J. Craf. L.C. & P.S. 441 (1964);
Spence, The Law of Crime Against Nature, 32 N.C.L. Rlv. 312 (1954); Comment
Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the Homosexual, 82 HARV. L.
R v. 1738 (1969); Note, Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.
Foatm 273 (1971); Project, The Consenting Homosexual and the Law: An
Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13
U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 643 (1966); Comment, Deviate Sexual Behavior Under the New
Illinois Criminal Code, 1965 IWAsH. U.L.Q. 220 (1965); Comment, Private Con-
sensual Homosexual Behavior: The Crime and Its Enforcement, 70 YALE L.J. 623(1961).
The authors of the Model Penal Code decided that consensual adult deviate
sexual intercourse should not be a crime. The draftsmen of new codes in Califoinia,
Kentucky, Michigan, and New Jersey agreed, as did the draftsmen of the Proposed
New Federal Criminal Code. So did the legislatures of Illinois and Oregon in
enacting their new criminal codes.
57. The widespread organization of homosexuals for better treatment in
society in terms of social acceptance, equal job opportunities, and freedom from
criminal prosecution may not be discounted. Humphreys, New Styles in Homo-
sexual Manliness, TANs-AcnoN, Mar. 1971, at 39.
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The second point is that a majority of the people in Missouri still
regard homosexuality as disgusting, degrading, degenerate, and a threat
to society. Whether this is rational or not, so long as the feeling persists
the majority will insist that its condemnation be reflected in a positive
manner in a criminal code even if it is unenforceable. It has the right
to do so, subject only to constitutional limitations, and it has the political
power to make its notions of the Good become True if not Beautiful.68
The third argument cautions practicality in politics. If the Proposed
Code does not make consenting adult homosexuality a crime, the legisla-
ture may react violently and reject the entire Proposed Code, leaving Mis-
souri with many laws, including those on sodomy, unreformed and much
worse than the compromises proposed by the committee.
None of these arguments is susceptible of reasoned and reasonable
analysis. This is not to suggest that the committee weaseled out of its
obligation to construct a rational criminal code by adopting a narrow
construction of its commission. Legislators have a dual responsibility to
legislate wisely and to reflect the wishes of the constituencies they represent.
The antinomy can be resolved only by some reasonable accommodation
of the one to the other. The committee's approach involves an attempt
to reflect society's general disapproval of consensual deviate sexual inter-
course while dealing more justly with offenders.
3. Mistake as to Capacity to Consent
Sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, or sexual contact are
crimes under the Proposed Code when committed with a person who is "in-
capacitated." The comment to section 11.010 defines "incapacitated" as
"that physical or mental condition, temporary or permanent, in which a per-
son is unconscious, unable to appraise the nature of his conduct, or unable
to communicate unwillingness to an act," and provides that "a person
is not 'incapacitated' with respect to an act committed upon him if he
became unconscious or unable to appraise the nature of his conduct after
consenting to the act." Section 11.020 (1) (a) of the Proposed Code then
provides:
[W]henever in this Chapter the criminality of conduct de-
pends upon a victim's being incapacitated, no crime is com-
mitted if the actor believed that the victim was not incapacitated
and believed that the victim consented to the act. The burden
of injecting the issue of mistake is on the defendant, but this does
not shift the burden of proof.
58. The majority does not invariably prevail, of course. Organized minority
groups with well-conceived, adequately financed, and properly propagandized
"power plays" determine the ultimate legislative result in some critical cases.
See, e.g., Roby, Politics and Criminal Law: Revision of the New York State Penal
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All of these sections are in substantial accord with existing Missouri
law. It is important to note that "mistake as to capacity to consent" must
be distinguished from "mistake as to age," which is covered as a separate
part of section 11.020.
a. Capacity to Consent
The law is dear enough as to what constitutes physical incapacity
to consent.59 As to persons mentally incapable of consenting, Missouri
cases have held that a woman with "weak intellect" may be yet capable
of consent to intercourse. 6 0 Some of the decisions indicate that the victim
must be able to understand "the immoral nature" of the act.61 Although
no issue was raised as to the propriety of the charge to the jury, several
cases quoted without disapproval instructions presenting the issue of
whether the victim was of such "unsound mind" or of "such weak intellect
or intelligence" or of "such weak and disordered mind" that she was not
able "to comprehend the nature and consequence of such act, and could
not understand right from wrong."62
The right-from-wrong test should not be applied in determining
mental capacity to consent to a sexual act for several reasons. The statutes
do not attempt to define or condemn immorality, except in the area of
consensual sodomy. Current Missouri law recognizes that the legal tests
of mental capacity to perform various acts may differ widely. Even the
Mental Responsibility Law differentiates between mental capacity to com-
mit crimes and mental capacity to proceed at various stages of the trial.
Here we are concerned with a very personal choice by the victim rather
than the actor. The interests to be protected so far as adults are concerned
are the individual's right of privacy, bodily integrity, human dignity, and
freedom from distasteful or traumatic sexual experiences.
b. Mistake as to Capacity to Consent
The Proposed Code again is in substantial accord with existing Mis-
souri law, under which a defendant is not guilty of rape of a person men-
tally incapable of consenting unless he knows of that incapacity, providing,
of course, that the victim appeared to consent and force or threats were
not employed.6 3 The defendant's knowledge is subjectively tested, though
59. Sexual intercourse with a woman who is asleep is rape because the act
is without her consent. State v. Stroud, 362 Mo. 124, 240 S.W.2d 111 (1951); State
v. Welch, 191 Mo. 179, 89 S.W. 945 (1905) (dictum). The same rule undoubtedly
applies to a victim rendered unconscious by force, drugs, or drink, or a person so
paralyzed as to be incapable either of resisting or signaling nonconsent.
60. State v. Cunningham, 100 Mo. 382, 12 S.W. 376 (1889).
61. State v. Schlichter, 263 Mo. 561, 173 S.W. 1072 (1915); State v. Warren,
232 Mo. 185, 134 S.W. 522 (1911).
62. State v. Schlichter, 263 Mo. 561, 173 S.W. 1072 (1915); State v. Williams,
149 Mo. 496, 51 S.W. 88 (1899).
63. State v. Robinson, 345 Mo. 897, 136 S.W.2d 1008 (1940); State v.
Helderle, 186 S.W. 696 (Mo. En Banc 1916); State v. Schlichter, 263 Mo. 561,
173 S.W. 1072 (1915); State v. Warren, 232 Mo. 185, 134 S.W. 522 (1911); State
v. Cunningham, 100 Mo. 382, 12 S.W. 376 (1889).
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proof of constructive knowledge may be made by circumstantial evidence.0 4
The actor's mistaken belief as to mental capacity to consent is distin-
guishable from his mistaken belief that the victim was of a sufficient age
to have the capacity to consent, because while every person is presumed
to be sane, there is no presumption that one has attained a certain age.
Further, for reasons of public policy the onus should be on the actor to be
certain that his victim is not under age.0 5
F. Forcible Compulsion and Other Aggravating Circumstances
1. Force and Threats
The Proposed Code provides higher penalties for illegal sexual inter-
course, deviate sexual intercourse, and sexual abuse ("sexual contact")
where they are accomplished by "forcible compulsion," a phrase defined
in section 11.010 as "either (a) physical force that overcomes reasonable
resistance, or (b) a threat, express or implied, that places a person in
reasonable fear of death, serious bodily injury or kidnapping of himself
or another person." The decision to regard the use of force or threats
as particularly reprehensible in the sexual offense cases was an easy one
for the committee to make. In a very real sense, forcible rape or sodomy
resemble felonious assault.66 Rape subjects the victim not only to the
unaccepted risk of unwanted pregnancy or venereal disease but also to
the likelihood of bodily harm in resisting the attack.
2. Infliction of Injury or Display of a Deadly Weapon
The present Missouri statutes recognize no aggravating circumstances,
such as gang rape, abuse of a position of guardianship or trust, pregnancy,
infection with a venereal disease, infliction of various bodily injury, or
use of a deadly weapon, as grounds for imposing an increased penalty for
rape. Statutes relating to assault and other crimes increase the punish-
ment where deadly weapons are used or where injury is threatened or
committed.67
The committee concluded that not only should rape and sodomy
be upgraded, increasing the penalties, where serious injury was inflicted
or a deadly weapon was displayed, but that simple logic required similar
treatment of almost all of the sexual offenses in chapter 11. This decision,
which involved a value judgment, gives considerably more flexibility in
the application of the law and justifies heavier penalties where these aggra-
vating circumstances are present.
V. PENALTIMS
The penalty provisions of other modem criminal codes cannot be
readily compared with each other or with the Proposed Code for at least
64. State v. Warren, 232 Mo. 185, 154 S.W. 522 (1911).
65. State v. Helderle, 186 S.W. 676 (Mo. En Banc 1916) (opinions of Faris,J. and Woodson, J.)
66. See § 559.190, RSMo 1969.
67. See § 556.140, RSMo 1969.
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two reasons: differences in defining and grading sexual offenses, and
differences in alternative sentencing procedures relating to all of the crim-
inal laws. Nevertheless, there is rough agreement on several propositions.
First, it is difficult for most people to think rationally about the
punishment that ought to be administered to a sex offender. He is an
"outsider" regarded emotionally with contempt and disgust, one who has
violated not only the criminal law but religious, moral, and social codes
as well. A vast amount of misinformation surrounds all sex offenses. We
know few of the facts that we should know in order to deal with sex
offenders, and we tend to fill the gap of ignorance with myths, rationaliza-
tions, and over-punishment. 68 Second, the most serious types of offenses
are rape and sodomy; less serious are the sexual contact cases; the least
serious are the noncontact offenses. Third, where the actor applies forcible
compulsion or where the victim is a prepubescent child, sexual offenses
should be regarded as aggravated and deserving of heavier punishment
than when those circumstances are not present. They should be upgraded
even further where a serious bodily injury is inflicted or where a deadly
weapon is displayed. Fourth, most sexual offenses should be felonies but
some should be misdemeanors, and, if possible, significant differentiating
factors ought to be written into the law to express the legislature's notions
of the suitability of the punishment to the crime.
Perhaps the most significant contributions of the Proposed Code
are a complete overhauling of the sanctions imposed for criminal vio-
lations and a combination of new methods and improved old methods
for dealing with convicted persons. A full treatment of this subject is
beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that the committee's pri-
mary goal in classifying and grading the sexual offenses was to enable
the legislature initially to provide for that type and range of punishment
suitable to the crime rather than to the person committing the crime.
Therefore, it is at once obvious that the committee's recommenda-
tions as to separation or classifications of different types of crimes are
merely suggestions, albeit carefully reasoned ones. If the general assembly
thinks that indecent exposure ought to be a class A, B, C, or D felony
instead of a class A misdemeanor, then its will can be done.
There was little, if any, dissent within the committee as to the penalty
recommendations in the Proposed Code. Forcible rape and sodomy and
sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a child under the
age of 12 years ought to be heavily punished; in the aggravated cases
these offenses deserve a class A felony designation. 9 Sexual intercourse
68. Little agreement exists among legal and psychiatric experts as to what
may properly be regarded as sex offenses or as to what punishment sex offenders
should face. GEBHARD, supra note 11, at 1-13; B. KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER
AND His OFFENSES 4-20, 42-48, 215-90, 404-14 (1954); G. MUELLER, LEGAL REGULA-
TiON OF SEXUAL CONDUcr 10-13 (1961); Sadoff, Sexually Deviated Offenders, 40
TEMPLE L.Q. 305 (1967).
69. PROF. NEw Mo. CRIm. CODE § 11.030 (1973).
21
Richardson: Richardson: Sexual Offenses
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
and deviate sexual intercourse with incapacitated persons and those 12
or 13 years of age should not carry as severe a penalty, especially where
mistake as to age is no defense and the victim may have not only consented
but deliberately solicited the sexual act. And so on, through the 11 crimes
set out in chapter 11.
Consensual adult homosexual contacts remain, as today, punishable
under the Proposed Code. However debatable that decision may be, a sub-
stantial majority will agree that the offense should not be labeled "sodomy"
or allotted the same punishment as cases involving forcible compulsion or
deviate sexual intercourse with persons under 16 years of age.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Proposed Code would make no essential change in most re-
spects in the present Missouri law of sexual offenses. Forcible and
statutory rape would remain severely punished crimes. The "age of
consent" of 16 years would be retained but would apply to all sex offenses,
induding the prohibitions against touching in the current child molesta-
tion statute.7 0 Consensual adult deviate sexual intercourse would continue
to be a crime, but the punishment would be reduced; persons married
to one another would be exempted.71 The most frequent sexual offenses-
indecent touching and indecent exposure-are extended to protect adults.
The decisional law respecting consent, incapacity to consent, mistake as
to capacity to consent, resistance, corroboration, prompt complaint, and
instructions to juries would remain undisturbed.
In addition to a few minor changes in the law, some of which have
been mentioned, a great deal is proposed by way of pruning out dead-
letter statutes, replanting some offenses in other sections of the Code,
and replacing vague and obsolete phrases72 with dear, modem terms.
The important major changes proposed are few. First, the principal
sex offenses (rape, sodomy, and sexual contact) would be split into a
number of graded offenses and labeled "rape," "sexual assault" in two
degrees, "sodomy," "deviate sexual assault" in two degrees, "sexual mis-
conduct," and "sexual abuse" in three degrees. Under this classification
the four basic offenses involving sexual intercourse, deviate sexual inter-
course, sexual contact, and indecent exposure would be subdivided into
the eleven offenses for the purpose of grading the punishment according
to the use of forcible compulsion, the capacity or incapacity of the victim
to consent, the age of the victim, and the age of the actor. Second, there
would be one new defense, mistake as to age, but it would be limited
to mistake as to the age of 14- or 15-year-old persons. 73
70. The only exception is that a 14 or 15 year old could consent to "sexual
contact." Id., § 11.120 (2).
71. Id., § 11.060 (1) (a).
72. See, e.g., § 563.230, RSMo 1969.
73. See statute quoted note 45 supra.
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The practical effects of the Proposed Code's proposals in the area of
sexual offenses may now be assessed. First, the major goals of the criminal
law would be easier to attain because of the availability of punishment be-
fitting the crime but adjustable to the individual offender for purposes of
deterrence and rehabilitation. Second, many objectives of a modernized
criminal code would be served, including a significant narrowing of the gap
between what people say they believe and how they actually behave. Third,
the enforcement of sex offense laws would become easier and the prosecu-
tion and processing of sex offenders would become more certain and equal
without sacrificing the flexibility needed for individual cases.
Much remains to be done. We need to know much more about sex
offenders, their motivations and characteristics, their recidivism rates,
their amenability to treatment, and their response to punishment of them-
selves and others. Accurate statistics must be kept so that trends can be
noted and projected and appropriate adjustments can be made in the entire
criminal justice system. Other disciplines, such as the social sciences, must
be drafted to help so that a massive, coordinated, informed approach can
be taken to the entire subject.
The studies already begun should be continued. We cannot afford
to let the substantive criminal law slumber for another century and a
half in Missouri. But it will surely do so unless there is some permanent,
compact body charged with the continuing responsibility of conducting
empirical studies, review, and realignment of maladjusted parts of the
system.74 Such a project requires financial support either from the legis-
lature or some charitable foundation and the willing assistance of the
bench, bar, and law schools. The committee's work has been completed,
but it should be regarded as only an interim report on work that will
never be finished. "The end of any great enterprise should also be a
beginning." 75
74. Other governments have effectively employed such a body. Pound, Intro.
duction to M. PLOscowE, Sex and The Law, at v (1951).
75. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 594, 607
(1963).
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APPENDIX: A
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF MISSOURI LAWS
RELATING TO CERTAIN SEXUAL OFFENSES
A. RAPE
Missouri Territorial law punished the forcible "carnal knowledge" of any
woman by castration "to be performed by the most skillful physician at the expense
of the territory, in case the party convicted shall not have sufficient property
to pay the same and costs." 1 Mo. Terr. Laws, Nov. 4, 1808, at 307, § 8. The
same punishment was prescribed for slaves. Id. at 828, § 35. Missouri enacted the
same law (§ 9, at 283, RSMo 1825) shortly after gaining statehood, with a new
section 10 making it an offense to "carnally know and abuse any female child
under the age of 10 years." Missouri's law provided for castration of slaves for
rape or attempted rape of a white person.
Section 28, at 170, RSMo 1835 covered forcible and statutory rape in
essentially the same language as the current statute, § 559.260, RSMo 1969,
except for the child's age and the punishment. The statute prohibits "car-
nally and unlawfully knowing any female child under the age of __._
years, or... forcibly ravishing any woman of the age of years or up-
ward." Under the 1885 law, the punishment for whites was imprisonment for
not less than 5 years. For any negro or mulatto who raped or attempted to rape
a white female, or forced or attempted to force her to marry him, or "defiled"
or attempted to "defile" or take her away for prostitution or concubinage, the
punishment was castration. § 28, at 170-71, RSMo 1835. In 1879, the legislature
raised the age of consent to 12 years and changed the punishment for rape for
all offenders to death or not less than 5 years imprisonment "in the discretion
of the jury." § 1253, RSMo 1879. The age of consent was increased to 14 years
in 1889 (§ 3480, RSMo 1889), to 15 years in 1918 (Mo. Laws 1913, at 219,
§ 2), and to 16 years in 1921 (Mo. Laws 1921, at 284a, § 1). Capital punishment,
abolished in 1917, was restored by Mo. Laws 1919, Ex. Sess., at 779, § 1.
B. SoDoMY
Missouri's sodomy statute, § 563.230, RSMo 1969, is essentially the same
as § 7, at 206, RSMo 1835. The punishment, initially not less than 10 years
imprisonment, was reduced in 1879 to not less than 2 years imprisonment. The
present words "with the sexual organs or with the mouth" were added by Mo.
Laws 1911, at 198, § 1. The statute provides that "[e]very person who shall be
convicted of the detestable and abominable crime against nature, committed with
mankind or with beast, with the sexual organs or with the mouth, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than 2 years." § 563.230,
RSMo 1969.
C. RAPE OF A DRUGGED VICInM
§ 559.270, RSMo 1969, provides that
[e]very person who shall have carnal knowledge of any woman above the
age of 14 years, without her consent, by administering to her any sub-
stance or liquid which shall produce such imbecility of mind or weak-
ness of body as to prevent effectual resistance, shall, upon conviction be
adjudged guilty of rape, and be punished by imprisonment in the
penitentiary for a term not less than 5 years.
This law is identical to § 24, at 170, RSMo 1835, except that the latter
statute set the victim's age at 10 years. The victim's age was raised to 12 years
in 1879 (§ 1254, RSMo 1879), and to 14 years in 1889 (§ 3481, RSMo 1889). It is
doubtful that this statute is enforced. No conviction under it has ever reached an
appellate court.
D. FORCING A WOMAN TO MARRY
§ 559.280, RSMo 1969, provides that
[elvery person who shall take any woman unlawfully against her will, and
by force, menace or duress, compel her to marry him, or to marry any
other person, or to be defiled, upon conviction thereof shall be punished
by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than 3 years.
This statute is identical to the original enactment except that formerly the
[Vol. 38
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punishment was not less than 3 or more than 10 years imprisonment. § 25, at
170, RSMo 1835. This statute may have been overlooked in 1913 when the anti-
prostitution statutes were passed. A similar provision, in the chapter on offenses
against morals, § 563.010, RSMo 1969, makes it a mixed felony, punishable
by a term of two to five years in prison, for any person to, inter alia, "take or
detain a female with intent to compel her by force, threats, menace or duress
to marry him or to marry any other person or be defiled."
We find no statute ever enacted in Missouri making "shotgun marriages"
of males unlawful.
E. ABDUCTON oF A WOMAN UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE
It is a felony punishable by imprisonment up to five years to "take away
any female under the age of 18 years from her father, mother, guardian or other
person having the legal charge of her person, either for the purpose of prostitu-
tion or concubinage." § 559.290, RSMo 1969. Subject to the same punishment
is "the father, mother, guardian or other person, having the legal charge of
her person who shall consent to the same." Id. The statute is unchanged since
§ 27, at 170, RSMo 1835, was enacted.
F. GUARDIAN DEFILING WARD
This statute provides that
[i]f any guardian of any female under the age of 18 years, or any other
person to whose care or protection any such female shall have been
confided, shall defile her, by carnally knowing her, while she remains
in his care, custody or employment, he shall, in cases not otherwise
provided for, be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not
exceeding 5 years, or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding
one year and a fine not less than $100.
§ 559.320, RSMo 1969. When first passed the punishment was not less than 2
years imprisonment or a fine of $500 or both. § 9, at 207, RSMo 1835.
G. SEDUCTION UNDER PROMISE OF MARRIAGE
This statute was passed in 1879 and provided that "[i]f any person shall,
under promise of marriage, seduce or debauch any unmarried female of good
repute, under twenty-one years of age, he shall be deemed guilty of a felony"
and imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than 2 nor more than 5 years
or fined not over $1,000. Prosecution was barred if the accused married the
girl before judgment. § 1259, RSMo 1879. The female's age was lowered to 18
in 1889. § 3486, RSMo 1889. It was increased to 21 years by Mo. Laws 1897, at
106, § 1. In 1907 the latter half of the statute was amended to read as follows:
[b]ut, if before the jury is sworn to try the defendant upon an indictment
or information, he shall marry the woman thus seduced, it shall be a
bar to any further prosecution of the offense, but an offer to marry the
female seduced by the party charged shall constitute no defense to
such prosecution; and in all cases where the defendant marries the woman
seduced the case shall be dismissed at the defendant's costs, and in no
event shall the state or county be adjudged to pay, or pay, any cost
made or incurred by the defendant when said cause has been dismissed
as aforesaid.
Mo. LAws 1907, at 229-30, § 1. § 559.310, RSMo 1969, is identical. § 546.340, RSMo
1969, provides that the complaining witness's evidence as to the promise of
marriage "must be corroborated to the same extent required of the principal
witness in perjury."
H. CARNAL KNOW.EDGE OF FEMA.E BETWEEN AGES 16 AND 18
This statute provides that "[ilf any person over the age of 17 years shall
have carnal knowledge of any unmarried female, of previously chaste character,
between the ages of 16 and 18 years of age, he shall be deemd guilty of a felony"
and either imprisoned in the penitentiary for 2 years, or fined from $100 to
$500, or held in the county jail for not less than 1 but not over 5 months, or
be subjected both to the jail and fine penalties "in the discretion of the court."
§ 559.300, RSMo 1969. The first enactment was Mo. Laws 1895, at 149, § 1.
Mo. Laws 1913, at 219, § 2 raised the male's age from 16 to 17, the minimum
female's age from 14 to 15, and increased the penitentiary confinement to "not
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exceeding 5 years." The legislature raised the minimum female's age to 16
in 1921, but failed to insert the changes regarding the male's age and the punish-
ment that had been made in 1913. Mo. Laws 1921, at 284a, § 1. The statute was
corrected in § 4394, RSMo 1939.
I. ADULTERY AND GRoss LEWDNESS
The present law, § 563.150, RSMo 1969, is substantially unchanged since
enactment. The original act punished any person living in "a state of open
and notorious adultery or fornication" or guilty of "open lewdness, or any
notorious act of public indecency grossly scandalous, and tending to debauch
the morals and manners of the people." § 77, at 306, RSMo 1825. The penalty
was light: a fine of not over $200 or not over one year in jail or both "at
the discretion of the court." Id. In 1835, the statute was changed to its present
form, providing that
[elvery person who shall live in a state of open and notorious adultery,
and every man and woman, one or both of whom are married, and not
to each other, who shall lewdly and lasciviously abide and cohabit with
each other, and every person, married or unmarried, who shall be guilty
of open, gross lewdness or lascivious behavior, or any open and notorious
act of public indecency, grossly scandalous, shall, on conviction, be
adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor.
§ 563.150, RSMo 1969. It is said that the statute contains five separate offenses;
finding them, however, is similar to identifying faces hidden in a nature draw-
ing entitling one to a chance for a Shetland pony. Those unable to find the
five faces may see State v. Sekrit, 130 Mo. 401, 32 S.W. 977 (1895), for the
answer.
The court in State v. Barnes, 256 S.W. 496 (St. L. Mo. App. 1923), said that
it is not the object of the statute to establish a censorship over the morals
of the people, nor to forbid the violation of the seventh command-
ment. ... Its evident object was not to forbid and punish furtive illicit
interviews between the sexes, however frequent and habitual their
occurrence, but only to make such acts punishable as it plainly designates;
acts which necessarily tend by their openness and notoriety, or by their
publicity, to debase and lower the standard of public morals.
Id. at 498.
Early Missouri courts eagerly found technical grounds for reversing convic-
tions under § 563.150. As a result, discouraged prosecutors abandoned at-
tempts to enforce it. Appellate courts have decided less than 10 cases in the
last 50 years. In the last reported case, 20 years ago, the court reversed a convic-
tion, having found that sex in a cemetery at 2:35 A.M., although near a drive-
way used by the public during the day, was not sex in a "public" place. State
v. Metje, 269 S.W.2d 128 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954). It is not a crime to arrange
"furtive, illicit interviews" in a modern tourist cabin, State v. Parker, 233 Mo.
App. 1037, 128 S.W.2d 288 (Spr. Ct. App. 1939), or in an old log cabin without
windows, lined inside with clapboards, and the doors dosed. State v. Phillips,
49 Mo. App. 325 (St. L. Ct. App. 1892).
J. CONTRIUTING TO THE DELINQUENCY OF A CHILD
Statutes on this subject date back to 1907. The most recent one, § 559.360,
RSMo 1969, enacted in 1959, provides that
[a]ny person who encourages, aids or causes a child under 17 years of age
to commit any act or engage in any conduct which would be injurious
to the child's morals or health or who commits any act or omits the
performance of any duty which contributes to, causes or tends to cause a
child under the age of 17 years to come within the provisions of [the
iuvenile court's laws], shall be punished by imprisonment in the county
iail for a term not exceeding 6 months or by a fine, not exceeding five
hundred dollars or by both ....
The court, however, "may impose conditions upon a person found guilty under
this section and so long as such person complies to the satisfaction of the court,
the sentence imposed may be suspended." § 559.360, RSMo 1969. This provision
is probably directed toward parents.
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K. MOLESTING MINOR WITH IMMORAL INTENT
§ 563.160, RSMo 1969, enacted in 1949, provides for imprisonment in
the penitentiary for a term of not more than 5 years, or a jail sentence of not
over one year, or fine of $500. or both, for
[any person who in the presence of any minor shall indulge in any
degrading, lewd, immoral or vicious habits or practices; or who shall
take indecent or improper liberties with such minor; or who shall
publicly expose his or her person to such minor in an obscene or in-
decent manner; or who shall by language. sign or touching such minor
suggest or refer to any immoral, lewd, lascivious or indecent act; or who
shall detain or divert such minor with intent to perpetrate any of the
aforesaid acts ....
Intent is not an essential element of the crime and consent is not a defense.
A "minor" is any person under the age of 21 years. State v. Chapple, 462 S.W.2d
•707 (Mo. 1971). Because the statute proscribes all types of sexual offenses,
including rape, sodomy, touching, indecent exposure, and even mere mention
of sexual intercourse, the true "age of consent" in Missouri is 21 years.
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